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When observable cues correlate with optimal choices, habit-driven behavior can alleviate 
cognition costs. We experimentally study the degree of sophistication in habit formation 
and cue selection. To this end, we compare lab treatments that differ in the information 
provided to subjects, holding fixed the serial correlation of optimal actions. We find that 
a particular cue – own past action – affects behavior only in treatments in which this 
habit is useful. The result suggests that caution is warranted when modeling habits via a 
fixed non-separable utility. Despite this sophistication, lab behavior also reveals myopia in 
information acquisition.
 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Habits play an important role in economic discourse. Economists employ them to explain diverse phenomena ranging 
from inertia of consumption to brand loyalty. Often, the standard modeling approach accounts for habits via the use of 
a fixed time-nonseparable utility function, thus leaving the issues of when and why habits form, and their responses to 
counterfactual environments, unaddressed. On the other hand, psychologists offer a view on both the purpose of and the 
mechanism underlying habit formation. In this literature, habits are typically defined as automated responses triggered by 
cues, where cues are past actions or other variables that empirically correlate with optimal continuation choices. In this 
view, the purpose of habits is to alleviate cognition costs; see Andrews (1903), Lally et al. (2010), and Wood and Neal 
(2007).
We explore the extent to which people’s behavior exhibits sophistication in habit formation and cue selection in a simple 
setting. This issue is crucial for an assessment of the common modeling approach to habits within economics. To the extent 
such sophistication is observed, it suggests that habits, at least in some economic applications, should be understood as 
endogenous, changing in predictable ways with the decision-making environment. Our main experimental results largely 
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support this position. Our subjects do form a habit when available cues are predictive of the current optimal choice and 
they do not form a habit otherwise, i.e., when the available cues cease to be informative guides for current choices. When 
multiple informative cues are available, subjects select the most informative one. We view these findings as suggesting 
that habit formation is a predictable response to changes in the decision-making environment. An understanding of habit 
formation rooted in optimization can inform analysts which cues, out of several available cues, a decision-maker is likely 
to leverage. Modeling habits as optimal adaptations also permits counterfactual predictions of habit strength under various 
policies.
To study sophistication in habit formation, we compare treatments from a lab experiment in which subjects face a 
sequence of tasks generated by a given stochastic process. The compared treatments differ only in the information feedback. 
If habits consist of naive repetitions of past actions, then the variation in feedback should not impact habit formation. Our 
data, however, show that subjects form habits with distinct cues across these treatments; moreover, the cues selected are 
naturally rationalized as adaptations to the information provided.
In our experiment, the basic task confronted by subjects is to recognize a binary state variable presented visually on 
a computer screen. Correctly identifying the state requires moderate cognitive effort.1 Each decision problem consists of a 
two-period sequence of this state-recognition task, across which the state evolves according to a known stochastic process 
with positive serial correlation. In the treatment without feedback, we reveal both realized states to the subjects only at 
the conclusion of the two-period sequence. We find that subjects form a habit in this treatment: the first-period outcome 
predicts the second-period choice (controlling for the second-period state) in this treatment. The cue that subjects leverage 
is their first-period action; the first-period state does not predict the second-period action. In other words, the behavioral 
pattern exhibits action inertia. The habit alleviates the subject’s cognitive burden since, due to the serial correlation of the 
states, the first-period action contains useful information about the second-period optimal choice, and the subjects utilize 
this information.
In the other treatment, with information feedback, we employ an identical state-generating process, but we reveal the 
first-period state before the second period task, so that subjects now know the first-period state before engaging in the 
second task. Subjects again form a habit in this treatment: payoff-irrelevant elements of the history predict the continuation 
choice (controlling for the second-period state). However, importantly, the cue changes relative to the previous treatment. 
The first-period action is no longer predictive; all of the predictive power is associated with the first-period state, which 
contains superior information about the optimal continuation action relative to the first-period action. This result suggests 
that our subjects demonstrate sophistication in the sense that they select cues according to their informational content. 
As a further check, we ran additional treatments (both with and without information feedback) in which the states were 
serially independent, so that the first period history contains no cues that correlate with the optimal second-period choice. 
As expected, subjects do not form habits in these treatments; the second-period choice is independent of all first-period 
variables (for both information treatments).
To the extent that habits are driven by optimal adaptations, their strength should vary predictably with the parameters 
of the environment, in particular, with the incentive stakes and the serial correlation of states. When stakes are decreased 
or correlation increased, the trade-off between reliance on the cues and the acquisition of new information shifts in favor 
of the cues. Thus, we predict that habits become stronger – cues become more predictive of continuation behavior – when 
stakes are lower and correlation is greater. We test this hypothesis experimentally. For the correlated treatments, changes 
in stakes and correlation have no impact on the cue selection, but they do affect the strength of habits. We obtain strong 
statistical evidence in favor of the predicted comparative statics when the selected cue is the past action. When the cue is 
the past state, the evidence continues to support the prediction, although it is less conclusive.
While, as discussed, some sophistication is observed in how subjects select and use cues in making their second-period 
choices, we also find indirect evidence of myopia in the information-acquisition process. When states are correlated and 
feedback is not provided then information is more valuable in the first period relative to the second period, since first-period 
information is useful in both periods. Consequently, a forward-looking decision-maker should acquire more information in 
the first than in the second period, and this should be manifested in the observed accuracy of choices. Since we do not 
observe differences in the accuracy of choice across periods, we conjecture that the subjects do not fully internalize the 
continuation value of information.
We analyze the experimental data through the predictions of a model that derives habit formation from primitive as-
sumptions on the information-processing friction. In the model, a decision-maker chooses information structures (i.e., a 
strategy for how to acquire information about the state), trading off the precision of her information against an acquisi-
tion cost. The model allows us to formalize the above intuitive predictions about habit formation, cue selection, and the 
comparative statics of habit strength, as testable hypotheses that derive from the model’s implications regarding optimal 
behavior.
Having summarized our findings, let us comment on their interpretation. As mentioned, part of the significance of our 
results derives from comparisons with how habits are understood and modeled in various contexts. Popular macroeco-
nomic models explain the empirically observed inertia of consumption by imposing a time-nonseparable utility function 
1 Identifying the state amounts to conducting a counting process, so that we can plausibly assume that frictions in the cognitive process are the main 
source of errors.






, where ct−1 is an aggregate of the consumption history, e.g. Pollak (1970) and Abel (1990). When u is concave, 
high past consumption triggers high current consumption; i.e., ct−1 becomes the cue underlying a consumption habit. Since 
the assumed utility representation is exogenous, the modeling choice of the aggregate ct−1 is not obvious and specifications 
in the literature include aggregates of past population-wide consumption, past individual consumption, and past individ-
ual consumption of specific categories of goods; see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) for a review. If, as suggested by our 
data, habit formation and cue selection is endogenous, responding to changes in the environment, then optimization-based 
models may offer insight into which habits form in which contexts and their associated comparative statics. Yet in other 
contexts, such as in the case of physiological dependencies akin to smoking, time-nonseparable utility functions may cap-
ture the causes of action inertia well. Relatedly, our experiment has indicated sophistication in habit formation in a specific 
environment which involves, in particular, a small number of task repetitions. Whether such sophistication extends to a 
larger number of repetitions of a basic task (along with a possibly more complex state process), in which largely automated 
behavior is perhaps more likely to be triggered, is an open question.
Other fields offer an alternative view, beyond the preference-based formulation mentioned above, on the ways in which 
habits are developed. Psychologists and neuroscientists emphasize procedural aspects of habitual behavior: it is automatic, 
largely subconscious and fast, in contrast to a deliberative decision-making process. Another defining aspect of habits within 
neuroscience is behavior-based: habits are triggered by historically formed cues and they may continue to be employed 
beyond the span of their functionality (e.g. Dezfouli and Balleine (2012)). Our definition of habits falls within this last, 
behavior-based approach; we say that a habit is formed if the first-period variables, irrelevant for the second-period payoffs, 
nonetheless predict the second-period behavior.
Within this literature, the closest papers to our work are Laibson (2001) and Camerer et al. (forthcoming). Laibson 
(2001) proposes a model of habit formation rooted in psychological forces that, like ours, focuses on an endogenous se-
lection among several available habit cues, albeit, unlike in our case, the cue selection is not rooted in the optimization of 
cognition costs. Camerer et al. (forthcoming) study a model of habit formation inspired by neuroeconomics. They specify 
an automatic process which governs switches between a habitual (model-free) mode and a preference-based mode of op-
timization (model-based). The habitual mode is dictated by a simple automatic procedure, in which historically successful 
actions are reinforced in a reward-contingent loop.
Most directly, our model of habit formation belongs to the rational-inattention literature originating in Sims (2003). It 
builds, in particular, on the discrete dynamic rational-inattention model by Steiner et al. (2017), which in turn extends a 
static model by Matějka and McKay (2015). Rational inattention models have been used to derive inertia of behavior in a 
macroeconomic context, see Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) for a theoretical contribution and Khaw et al. (2017) for an 
experimental exploration. Khaw and Zorrilla (2018) find that lab subjects develop action inertia in a saving problem and, 
like us, the authors interpret the observed inertia as habits.2
2. Model and hypotheses
We study habit formation in the simplest possible setting. A decision-maker (DM) chooses a binary action at ∈ {0, 1} in 
each of two periods and receives 
∑2
t=1 u(at , θt). The binary state θt ∈ {0, 1} evolves according to a stochastic process known 
to the DM. The first-period state attains value 1 with prior probability p1 , and θ2 = θ1 with probability γ ≥ 12 for each value 
of θ1 . The two states are independent when γ = 12 , and they are positively correlated when γ >
1
2
. In the latter case, we 
say that the states are persistent. The DM’s task in each period is to match the action to the state; u(a, θ) = s if a = θ and 
zero otherwise; s > 0 is the stake.
We allow for (and focus on) the possibility that even though the state realizations are available for the DM’s inspection, 
establishing complete information is costly. Consequently, behavior is stochastic.
2.1. Definitions
We now introduce terminology to allow us to define habits in the context of dynamic stochastic choice.
An analyst collects data on the states and actions across many repetitions of the two-period decision problem. In its 
idealized form, the analyst observes the joint probability distribution p(θ1, a1, θ2, a2) over the quadruples of states and 
chosen actions. Our data extend the state-dependent stochastic-choice data introduced by Caplin and Dean (2015) in a 
static setting to the dynamic context considered here.
We say that the DM forms a habit if there exists a triple (θ1, θ2, a1) ∈ {0, 1}3 such that p(a2 | θ2, θ1, a1) = p(a2 | θ2). 
Otherwise, if a2 is independent of (θ1, a1) conditional on θ2 , we say that the DM does not form a habit. Thus, the DM forms 
a habit if the history of the process – which is irrelevant to the continuation payoff – predicts continuation behavior. Our 
definition of habits is behavioral in nature and distinct from the commonly used non-separable utility approach. Our analyst 
knows that the DM’s utility is, in fact, time-separable; she attributes any correlation between the history and continuation 
behavior to imperfections in the decision-making process, and refers to the predictive power of the history as a habit.
2 Within information-based approach to habits, Angeletos and Huo (2018) prove the observational equivalence between a model featuring higher-order 
uncertainty, and a model of a representative agent with consumption habits.
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Additionally, we define cues that drive the habitual behavior. Is the habitual behavior in the second period, if it arises, 
triggered by the past state θ1 , or by the past action a1? Let z be one of the two random variables in the set {θ1, a1} and 
w be the complementary variable from this set. We say that z is the cue for the habit if (i) p(a2 = 1 | θ2, z = 1) > p(a2 = 1 |
θ2, z = 0), and if (ii) p(a2 = 1 | θ2, z, w) = p(a2 = 1 | θ2, z). Thus, for instance, the past action a1 is the cue for the habit if the 
probability that the DM chooses the high action in the second period increases with a1 given θ2 , and θ1 has no additional 
predictive power. The latter condition prevents a spurious identification of cues. Since θ1 and a1 may be correlated (and 
indeed are correlated in our data), it may happen that they both correlate with continuation behavior, but all the predictive 
information is contained in only one of them.3
The correlation between cues and continuation behavior may vary with the DM’s environment; hence, habits may exhibit 
a continuous range of strength. We capture this as follows. Suppose that the DM has developed a habit with cue z ∈ {θ1, a1}. 
For a state value θ ∈ {0, 1}, we define the habit strength φz(θ) at state realization θ2 = θ to be
φz(θ) =
p(a2 = θ | θ2 = θ, z = θ)
p(a2 = θ | θ2 = θ, z = 1− θ)
,
which measures how strongly the probability that the DM chooses the correct a2 varies with the cue value in the state 
θ2 = θ .
2.2. A rational-inattention model of habit formation
We model habits as optimal adaptations to an information-processing friction. This is operationalized by allowing the DM 
to choose among information acquisition procedures that differ both in their overall precision and also in the distributions 
of various types of errors. That is, the DM conducts costly statistical experiments that produce signals xt in periods t = 1, 2. 
Additionally, in between periods 1 and 2, she receives an exogenous signal y that captures possible experimental feedback 
between periods. In each period t , the DM chooses an action according to a pure action strategy σt that maps the observed 
signals up to period t to at ; a1 = σ1(x1) and a2 = σ2(x1, x2, y). The DM controls the experiments that generate xt and 
can condition the employed experiment on all the available information at the given period: Let X , |X | ≥ 2, be a fixed 
signal space. The DM can choose any first-period experiment f1(x1 | θ1) and any system of second-period experiments 
f2(x2 | θ2, x1, y) that govern the conditional probability distribution of the signals xt ∈ X for each combination of the values 
of the random variables specified in the condition. The signal x1 is constrained to be independent from θ2 conditional on 
θ1 . Similarly, x2 is constrained to be independent from θ1 conditional on (θ2, x1, y); the DM learns about θt only in period t .
We consider two distinct processes that generate the exogenous signal y. In one case, y perfectly reveals the first state; 
y = θ1 , and we say that the DM receives feedback. In the other case, y = y0 , where y0 is an arbitrary constant, and we say 
that the DM does not receive feedback.
Following the rational-inattention literature, we specify a uniformly posterior-separable information cost; see Caplin et 
al. (2017). Let H : [0, 1] −→ R be a strictly concave function. The cost of the first-period experiment f1(x1 | θ1) is






where p1 is the prior probability that θ1 = 1 and q̂1 = Pr (θ1 = 1 | x1). Together with the literature, we interpret H(q) as 
the measure of uncertainty associated with the belief that assigns probability q to θ1 = 1 and I(θ1; x1) is the expected 
reduction of this uncertainty achieved by the observation of the signal x1 . When H is Shannon entropy, then I(θ1; x1) is the 
mutual information between the random variables θ1 and x1 , and the information cost coincides with that in Sims (2003). 
Analogously, for any given signal realizations x1 and y, the cost of the second-period experiment is









where p2 = Pr (θ2 = 1 | x1, y) is the DM’s belief about θ2 at the beginning of the second period and q̂2 = Pr(θ2 = 1 | x1, y, x2)
is the posterior belief. The DM maximizes her expected net payoff.4 She solves
max
f1, f2,σ1,σ2
E [u (σ1 (x1) , θ1) + u (σ2 (x1, x2, y) , θ2) − I (θ1; x1) − I (θ2; x2 | x1, y)] .
Let p(θ1, a1, θ2, a2) be the joint distribution of the states and actions generated by the optimal experiments f ∗1 and f
∗
2
and action strategies σ ∗1 , σ
∗
2 . We impose a regularity condition that all quadruples (θ1, a1, θ2, a2) are attained with positive 
probabilities. The condition holds when the cost function is sufficiently scaled down, and is satisfied in our experimental 
data.
3 Our definition of cues has roots in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. These fields conceptualize habits as tendencies to choose actions that have 
been previously rewarding (e.g. Dezfouli and Balleine 2012). Since our first-period cues correlate with the optimal first-period actions, conditioning on the 
cues correlates the second-period choices with the first-period optimal choices.
4 We abstract from the optimization process. It is likely that lab subjects cannot directly solve for the optimal information acquisition procedure, nor do 
they know costs of all information acquisition procedures. A promising direction for a study of the optimization process is that of reinforcement learning; 
e.g. Roth and Erev (1995) and Watkins and Dayan (1992).
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Lemma 1. The optimal joint distribution p of states and actions is unique.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
The next proposition characterizes the patterns of habit formation that arise under optimal information acquisition. In 
particular, the model predicts that habits are formed only if the available cues contain useful information about optimal con-
tinuation choices and that, in such cases, the most informative available cue is selected. In brackets, we label the hypotheses 
that we will test experimentally below.
Proposition 1.
(H1.1) If states are independent, then the DM does not form a habit.
(H1.2) If states are persistent and the DM does not receive feedback, then she forms a habit with the cue a1.
(H1.3) If states are persistent and the DM receives feedback, then she forms a habit with the cue θ1.
We expect H1.1 and H1.3 to hold for a wide range of information-processing frictions. In contrast, H1.2 relies in a subtle 
way on the assumption of a posterior-separable cost. It may fail for alternative information-cost specifications, such as those 
in which the DM pays for a reduction of Gaussian noise. Recall from our definition that for a1 to be the habit cue, it must 
be that, conditional on (θ2, a1), the state θ1 does not predict a2 . This is indeed the case under the posterior-separable cost 
function because each action a1 = 0, 1 corresponds to a unique information set; without feedback, a1 is a sufficient statistic 
for the DM’s belief at the beginning of the second period. Under alternative specifications, such as the Gaussian one, each 
a1 = 0, 1 may correspond to multiple information sets. As a result, θ1 may predict the DM’s information set at the beginning 
of the second period, and hence indirectly predict a2 , controlling for (θ2, a1).
We turn now to the comparative-statics results. To proceed, we impose additional structure on the information-cost 
specification.
Assumption A. The information-cost function H satisfies the following four properties:
(A.1) symmetry; H(q) = H(1 − q) for all q ∈ [0, 1],
(A.2) H is twice differentiable,
(A.3) H is steep at certainty; limq→0+ H
′(q) = ∞,
(A.4) H ′′(q) ≤ H ′′(q′) for any q, q′ such that |q − 1/2| > |q′ − 1/2|.
Observe that all four properties in Assumption A are satisfied by both Shannon entropy costs and by the log-likelihood 
cost function from Morris and Strack (2017).
When states are correlated and there is no feedback, information acquired in the first period has positive continuation 
value beyond its use in the first period choice. Thus, forward-looking subjects should acquire more information in the first 
period relative to the second one. The next result formalizes this intuition under Assumption A.
Proposition 2 (H2). Suppose that the cost function satisfies Assumption A. If the states are persistent and the DM does not receive 
feedback, then the DM chooses the correct action with higher probability in period 1 than in period 2,
p(a1 = θ1) > p(a2 = θ2).
Finally, our last result establishes natural comparative-statics predictions of the habit strength with respect to stakes 
and state persistence γ . The proof of one of the results – comparative statics with respect to stakes in the setting without 
feedback, part (iii) below, exploits the functional form of the Shannon-entropy cost. The other comparative statics results 
are derived for all cost functions satisfying Assumption A.5
Proposition 3. Suppose the states are persistent and the cost function satisfies Assumption A. Then the habit strength
(i) increases with the state persistence under both feedback treatments,
(ii) decreases with stakes in the presence of feedback,
(iii) also decreases with stakes in the absence of feedback, if the cost function is given by Shannon entropy.
To economize on the number of the experimental treatments, we formulate a testable hypothesis that is coarser than 
the statement in Proposition 3.
Hypothesis (H3). For each treatment with persistent states, the formed habits are stronger when persistence is high and stakes are low 
than when persistence is low and stakes are high.
5 Shannon entropy for a binary random variable is given by HShannon(q) = −q logq − (1 − q) log(1 − q).
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Table 1
Hypotheses on habit formation for the eight experimental treatments.
Weak treatments Strong treatments
high stakes no feedback feedback low stakes no feedback feedback
state independence no habit no habit state independence no habit no habit
low persistence weak habit weak habit high persistence strong habit strong habit
with cue a1 with cue θ1 with cue a1 with cue θ1
Table 2
Experimental treatments.
Weak treatments Strong treatments
high stakes: $10 no feedback feedback low stakes: $7 no feedback feedback
persistence γ = .5 INW I FW persistence γ = .5 IN S I F S
persistence γ = .75 CNW C FW persistence γ = .9 CNS C F S
3. Experimental design and data
Broadly, the structure of our design is as follows. We vary the experimental treatments along three dimensions: (i) we 
consider independent or positively serially correlated states, (ii) we provide feedback or not in terms of revealing θ1 before 
the second period task, and (iii) we vary the stakes and the state correlation. Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses on habit 
formation, cue selection, and habit strength in the resulting eight treatments.
Our experimental subjects are incentivized to identify a binary state θt in each period t = 1, 2 by counting objects 
presented on a computer screen. Estimation (e.g., counting) procedures may differ in the induced error distributions of 
actions and in the associated cognitive and time costs. A subject’s choice over procedures thus involves tradeoffs akin to 
those formally studied in the previous section.6
In more detail, subjects were presented with images of a 10 × 10 matrix of red and blue dots on a computer screen. 
In each matrix, either 51 red and 49 blue (state θ = 1) or 51 blue and 49 red dots (θ = 0) are displayed. The positions 
of the colored dots are random conditional on the state; see the screenshot in Appendix A.3. Subjects are incentivized to 
determine the majority color and do not face explicit informational cost; any perception errors stem from frictions in the 
cognitive process. When a subject is ready, she enters her choice by clicking one of two radio buttons marked “Red” and 
“Blue”.7 To ensure a reasonable duration of the experiment, each image disappeared after 45 seconds.8 The experiments 
were implemented using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We refer to the above one-period decision problem as the counting task.
We recruited 76 subjects from the University of California, Santa Barbara over 4 sessions during May 2018. In each 
session, subjects faced 4 treatments. Each treatment consisted of 12 iterations and each iteration consisted of the two-period 
decision problem described above, with one counting task per period. Thus, each subject faced 96 = 4 × 12 × 2 counting 
tasks in total. At the conclusion of the session, the software randomly chose a single counting task for each subject, and the 
subject’s payment was based only on the outcome of that task.
An “iteration” is thus our basic unit of observation. In each iteration, both state realizations were equally likely in the 
first period: p1 = 1/2. The four treatments per session are defined by the combinations of (i) the state persistence, where 
I denotes independent and C denotes correlated states, and (ii) whether θ1 was revealed in between the two periods, where 
F denotes the provision of information feedback and N denotes no provision. In addition, in two of the sessions we used 
parameters that correspond to the hypothesis of inducing strong habits; treatments in these two sessions are denoted by S , 
and the treatments in the other two sessions are labeled by W (for weak habits). We thus have 8 treatments from the set 
{I, C} ×{N, F } ×{W , S}; see Table 2. We randomly generated the state sequence once for each of the 8 treatments and used 
it in both sessions in which the treatment occurred. Within a treatment, each subject faced the same sequence of images. 
Each subject has participated in exactly one session. The 4 sessions featured the following sequences of the treatments, 
(I FW , C FW , INW , CNW ), (INW , CNW , I FW , C FW ), (I F S, C F S, IN S, CNS), and (IN S, CNS, I F S, C F S), respectively.
Additionally, we ran a preliminary session prior to the 4 regular sessions. The results from this session are consistent 
with those from the regular sessions. We omit this session from the analysis due to a minor error in the experimental 
procedure; see Appendix A.2.
Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes. In all cases, subjects received a $10 show-up fee. Average total earnings 
per subject were $17.27 paid in cash at the conclusion of the experiment. The expected marginal payoff for each correct 
answer was $ 10
96
≈ $.1 in W treatments and it was $ 7
96
≈ $.07 in S treatments which is comparable to incentives in Caplin 
and Dean (2013) that varied from $.01 to $.15. See Appendix A.3 for our experimental instructions.
6 The real-effort task enhances the external validity of the procedure. The particular counting task, adapted from Caplin and Dean (2015), facilitates 
comparability with the active experimental literature on information processing.
7 Since we are interested in serial correlations that arise in the absence of real switching costs, we set the positions of the blue and red radio buttons to 
randomly vary across tasks. Thus, provision of the same answer in consecutive periods does not arise from a mental or physiological advantage.
8 The subjects could submit their choices after the image had disappeared. The time constraint was binding at similar levels across treatments, in only 
2-3% of problems.
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Table 3
Data summary.
Frequency of a1 = θ1 Frequency of a2 = θ2 Frequency of a2 = a1 Frequency of a1 = θ2
INW .84 .86 .51 .50
I FW .85 .85 .60 .61
CNW .87 .86 .78 .74
C FW .89 .90 .78 .77
IN S .87 .85 .51 .50
I F S .82 .82 .53 .55
CNS .84 .85 .91 .84
C F S .86 .87 .75 .73
Table 4
Average marginal treatment effects, (their standard errors), and the 
p-values in the second lines. Bold values indicate significance at 
the 1% level.
I FW INW C FW CNW
a1 -.021 (.036) .034 (.041) .017 (.032) .191 (.051)
.548 .406 .603 .000
θ1 .071 (.043) -.026 (.049) .258 (.058) .002 (.036)
.092 .596 .000 .948
θ2 .681 (.032) .692 (.054) .611 (.046) .629 (.067)
.000 .000 .000 .000
I F S IN S C F S CNS
a1 -.031 (.037) .037 (.045) -.033 (.026) .511 (.110)
.401 .416 .204 .000
θ1 .009 (.040) -.034 (.044) .498 (.098) omitted
.817 .430 .000
θ2 .632 (.045) .700 (.036) .425 (.121) .367 (.098)
.000 .000 .000 .000
4. Results
We present basic summary statistics in Table 3. The aggregate accuracy of choices is relatively high and homogeneous 
across treatments and periods. Accuracy is heterogeneous at the individual level; the number of correctly answered tasks 
per subject varied from 46 to 96 out of 96 tasks. Mild action persistence in the treatment I FW , in which the frequency 
of a1 = a2 is 0.60, is caused by the realized frequency of θ1 = θ2 being 0.67 and by the subjects’ attentiveness to the state 
realizations.9
To check for trends in choice accuracy over the duration of a session we ran a logit regression in which we explain 
whether subject’s choice at is correct by the number of counting task pairs she has already encountered and by treat-
ment dummies. We run two such separate regressions for t = 1, 2. In both cases, the length of the previous exposure is 
insignificant. Thus, we see no evidence of experience building or fatigue; see Section 1 of the regression supplement for 
details.
We proceed to test for the presence of habits and to identify the associated cues. To examine how θ1 and a1 predict a2 , 
we run separate logit regressions for all 8 treatments of the form:
an2,i =
{






1,i + βsesession + βscscore
n









with robust standard errors clustered at the subject level, where ant,i is the action taken by subject i in iteration n = 1, . . . , 12
and period t = 1, 2; θnt is the realized state in iteration n and period t; and session is a dummy variable indicating session 
(each of the 8 treatments occurs in exactly two sessions).10 Finally, we include the interaction term scoreni θ
n
2 (and the term 
scoreni ), where score
n
i is a subject-specific proxy for counting ability. It is the total number of correct answers by subject i in 
all treatments (excluding the two choices from iteration n of the considered treatment to avoid endogeneity). The interaction 
term scoreni θ
n
2 captures the idiosyncratic sensitivity of the subjects to the variation in θ2 . Otherwise, failing to account for 
heterogeneity in counting ability may lead to spurious significance of θ1 in the correlated treatments without feedback: for 
a given a1 , θ1 = a1 predicts high counting ability (i.e., low information cost) which, in turn, predicts a2 = θ2 . Hence, under 
state persistence, it predicts a2 = θ1 .
Table 4 reports the estimated average marginal effects, their standard errors and p-values of the explanatory variables of 
interest. We draw the following conclusions from this analysis.





10 In the treatment CNS , the state realizations satisfied θn1 = θn2 for all n, and thus we dropped θ1 from that treatment’s regression.
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We first obtain the elementary confirmation that subjects pay attention to the payoff states.
Result (R0). Subjects pay attention to θ2: θ2 predicts a2 in all treatments.
The next findings confirm Hypotheses H1.1, H1.2, and H1.3.
Result.
(R1.1) When the states are independent, the subjects do not form habits: neither a1 nor θ1 predict a2 in treatments I FW , 
INW , I F S , and IN S .
(R1.2) When the states are persistent and feedback is not provided, the subjects form a habit with cue a1 : a1 predicts a2
and θ1 does not predict a2 in treatments CNW and CNS .
(R1.3) When the states are persistent and feedback is provided, the subjects form a habit with cue θ1 : θ1 predicts a2 and 
a1 does not predict a2 in treatments C FW and C F S .
Next, we compare choice accuracy in the first and the second periods under persistent states without feedback (treat-
ments CNW and CNS). For t = 1, 2, let rt ∈ {c, w} indicate correct and wrong response in period t , respectively. We test the 
hypothesis that the marginal probabilities of correct answers are equal across the two periods, Pr(r1 = c) = Pr(r2 = c). Since 
rt are binary and correlated random variables, we apply McNemar’s test; see McNemar (1947). We cannot reject the hypoth-
esis of equal precisions both for the CNW treatment (p-value .29) and for the CNS treatment (p-value .42). Accordingly, 
the data do not confirm Hypothesis H2. We interpret this finding as indirect evidence of myopia in information acquisition, 
whereby subjects do not fully account for the positive continuation value of information under state persistence.
Result (R2). Choice accuracy does not differ significantly across the first and second periods in the treatments with persistent 
states and no feedback.
To analyze the comparative statics of habit strength, we focus on the four treatments with persistent states in which 
habits are formed, and we compare the habit strength across the weak and strong treatments. Specifically, for the treatments 
without feedback, we pool the data from CNW and CNS and create a dummy variable δ ∈ {0, 1} to indicate treatment S . We 










Since the empirical habit cue is a1 , we estimate the difference between the average marginal effect of a1 conditional on 
δ = 1 (S) and its average marginal effect conditional on δ = 0 (W ),
	CN = EX [Pr(a2 = 1 | a1 = 1, X, δ = 1) − Pr(a2 = 1 | a1 = 0, X, δ = 1)
−
(
Pr(a2 = 1 | a1 = 1, X, δ = 0) − Pr(a2 = 1 | a1 = 0, X, δ = 0)
)]
,
where X stands for all explanatory variables other than a1 and δ. We obtain a point estimate 	̂CN = .31 with standard error 
.12, which is highly significant (p-value .009).
Analogously, for the treatments with feedback, we pool the data from treatments C FW and C F S and create a dummy 









2 . As the habit cue in these treatments is θ1 , we estimate the difference between the average marginal 
effect of θ1 conditional on δ = 1 (S) and its average marginal effect conditional on δ = 0 (W ),
	C F = EX [Pr(a2 = 1 | θ1 = 1, X, δ = 1) − Pr(a2 = 1 | θ1 = 0, X, δ = 1)
−
(
Pr(a2 = 1 | θ1 = 1, X, δ = 0) − Pr(a2 = 1 | θ1 = 0, X, δ = 0)
)]
.
Here, we obtain the point estimate 	̂C F = .23 with standard error .12, which is marginally significant (p-value .06).
Result (R3). We find strong (suggestive) statistical evidence that the habit formed in the correlated treatments without 
(with) feedback is stronger in the treatment with high persistence and low incentives than in the treatment with low 
persistence and high incentives.
5. Summary
Our experiment reveals a significant degree of sophistication in habit formation, cue selection, and in the degree of habit 
strength. This sophistication favors, in the environment studied here, concepts of habits based on explicit optimization under 
11 We have excluded the interaction term δθ1n , since the state realizations satisfied θn1 = θn2 for all n in CNS .
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information frictions. A promising implication of these findings is that models of habits that are based on optimization of the 
relevant tradeoffs may provide us with useful comparative-statics predictions. Yet, despite the documented sophistication, 




Proof of Lemma 1. We solve the problem backwards. Let p2 be the probability that the DM assigns to θ2 = 1 at the begin-
ning of the period 2. Let v(q) = s max{q, 1 −q} be the DM’s expected optimized second-period payoff at a given value of the 
posterior q = Pr(θ2 = 1 | x1, y, x2). The DM chooses a random second-period posterior q̂2 that maximizes the second-period 





v(q̂2) − H(p2) + H(q̂2)
]
s.t.: Eq̂2 q̂2 = p2.
We let w2(p2) be the value of the above problem. This second-period problem can be solved by the concavification of 
v(·) + H(·); see Caplin and Dean (2013). Since θ2 has binary support, the support of the second-period posterior q̂2 is at 
most binary. Additionally, due to our regularity condition, both a2 = 0 and a2 = 1 occur with positive probabilities, and thus 
the support of q̂2 contains one value q below and one value q above 1/2. The values q and q are independent of p2 .
In the setting without feedback, p2 attains the random value p̂2 = γ q̂1 + (1 − γ )(1 − q̂1) where q̂1 = Pr(θ1 | x1) is the 
random posterior at the end of the period 1. Let
vn1(q1) = v(q1) + w2 (γ q1 + (1− γ )(1− q1))
be the value of the DM whose first-period posterior belief q̂1 attains value q1; it consists of the immediate expected payoff 
v(q1) for the first-period action and of the continuation payoff w2 (γ q1 + (1− γ )(1 − q1)). The DM chooses a random 





vn1(q̂1) − H(p1) + H(q̂1)
]
s.t.: Eq̂1 q̂1 = p1,
where p1 is the prior probability that θ1 = 1. This problem can also be solved by concavification. Again, due to the binary 
support of θ1 and the regularity condition, q̂1 attains two values that we denote by qn < 1/2 and q
n > 1/2. Again, this 
support is independent of p1 .







1 (q̂1) − H(p1) + H(q̂1)
]




1 (q1) = v(q1) + Ey [w2 (γ y + (1 − γ )(1− y))] .
Since the continuation value w2 (γ y + (1− γ )(1 − y)) does not depend on the first-period posterior, the DM chooses the 
support of q̂1 to be the same as that of q̂2; q̂1 attains values q and q, again, independently of p1 .
The joint distribution p(θ1, θ2, a1, a2) is uniquely determined by the binary supports of q̂1 and q̂2 . 
Proof of Proposition 1. Statement 1.: The support of the random second-period posterior is independent of the first-period 
posterior and of y. Since θ1 and θ2 are independent, the prior p2 at the beginning of period 2 is independent of θ1 and a1 . 
Thus, the random second-period posterior (and hence a2) is a r.v. independent of θ1 and a1 , conditionally on θ2 , as needed.
Statement 2.:




















The right-hand sides do not depend on θ1 , as needed. It suffices to prove that for each θ2 ∈ {0, 1}, the first expression 
exceeds the latter. We consider the case θ2 = 1; the computation for θ2 = 0 is analogous.
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qnγ + (1 − qn)(1− γ ) − q
qnγ + (1− qn)(1 − γ )
= ϕ
(








. An analogous computation implies that p(a2 = 1 | θ2 = 1, a1 = 0) = ϕ
(
qnγ + (1 − qn)(1 − γ )
)
. The 
claim follows from the monotonicity of ϕ .
Statement 3.: When the DM receives feedback, then her belief at the beginning of period 2 is p̂2 = γ θ1 + (1 − γ )(1 − θ1). 
Since p̂2 and the values of the second-period posteriors q and q do not depend on a1 , p(a2 | θ2, θ1, a1) does not depend on 
a1 , as needed.
Let us consider θ2 = 1 (the case of θ2 = 0 is again analogous). The values of the second-period posteriors, q and q, are 
the same as in the setting without feedback. Thus again, as in the proof of Statement 2,
p(a2 = 1 | θ2 = 1, θ1 = 1) = ϕ(γ ) > ϕ(1− γ ) = p(a2 = 1 | θ2 = 1, θ1 = 0). 
The next lemma is an auxiliary result that we use in the proof of Proposition 3. It characterizes the habit strength as a 
function of the posterior values. To economize on notation, we write from now on q2 ∈ [1/2, 1) = p(θ2 = 1 | a2 = 1) = q for 
the higher of the two realizations of the second-period posterior, and we note that thanks to the symmetry of the setting, 
p(θ2 = 1 | a2 = 0) = 1 − q2 both in the settings with and without feedback. Similarly, we write q1 ∈ [1/2, 1) for the high 
realization of the first-period posterior p(θ1 = 1 | a1 = 1) and note that p(θ1 = 1 | a1 = 0) = 1 − q1 in the both settings. 
We recall that the value of q1 depends on the feedback specification. Finally, in the setting without feedback, we let p2
stand for the belief at the beginning of period 2 of the DM who chose a1 = 1 in period 1. It is p2 = p(θ2 = 1 | a1 = 1) =
γ q1 + (1 − γ )(1 − q1). We recall that the belief at the beginning of period 2 is γ θ1 + (1 − γ )(1 − θ1) in the setting with 
feedback.
Lemma 2.
1. In the setting without feedback, the habit strength is
φa1(θ2) =





2. In the setting with feedback, the habit strength is
φθ1(θ2) =





(Observe that habit strength is independent of θ2 in both cases.)
Proof of Lemma 2. Statement 1.: By its definition, habit strength when the cue is the first-period action is,
φa1(θ) =
p(a2 = θ | θ2 = θ,a1 = θ)
p(a2 = θ | θ2 = θ,a1 = 1− θ)
=
p(θ2 = θ | a2 = θ,a1 = θ)p(a2 = θ | a1 = θ)/p(θ2 = θ | a1 = θ)
p(θ2 = θ | a2 = θ,a1 = 1− θ)p(a2 = θ | a1 = 1− θ)/p(θ2 = θ | a1 = 1− θ)
.
Since the posterior p(θ2 = θ | a2 = θ, a1) is independent of a1 ,
φa1(θ) =
p(a2 = θ | a1 = θ)/p(θ2 = θ | a1 = θ)
p(a2 = θ | a1 = 1− θ)/p(θ2 = θ | a1 = 1− θ)
=
(p2 + q2 − 1)/p2
(q2 − p2)/(1 − p2)
,
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where we have used the martingale condition imposed on the second-period posteriors to derive p(a2 = θ | a1 = θ) =
p2+q2−1
2q2−1
and p(a2 = θ | a1 = 1 − θ) =
q2−p2
2q2−1
, and we have noted that p(θ2 = θ | a1 = θ) = p2 and p(θ2 = θ | a1 = 1 − θ) =
1 − p2 .
Statement 2.: When the cue is the first-period state then the habit strength is defined as
φθ1(θ) =
p(a2 = θ | θ2 = θ, θ1 = θ)
p(a2 = θ | θ2 = θ, θ1 = 1− θ)
=
p(θ2 = θ | a2 = θ, θ1 = θ)p(a2 = θ | θ1 = θ)/p(θ2 = θ | θ1 = θ)
p(θ2 = θ | a2 = θ, θ1 = 1− θ)p(a2 = θ | θ1 = 1− θ)/p(θ2 = θ | θ1 = 1− θ)
.
Since the posterior p(θ2 = θ | a2 = θ, θ1) is independent of θ1 ,
φθ1(θ) =
p(a2 = θ | θ1 = θ)/p(θ2 = θ | θ1 = θ)
p(a2 = θ | θ1 = 1− θ)/p(θ2 = θ | θ1 = 1− θ)
=
(γ + q2 − 1)/γ
(q2 − γ )/(1− γ )
,
where we have used the martingale condition imposed on the second-period posteriors to derive that p(a2 = θ | θ1 = θ) =
γ +q2−1
2q2−1








s (q1 + q2) − H(p1) + H(q1) − H (γ q1 + (1− γ )(1− q1)) + H(q2)
}
.
The second-period posterior q2 ≥ 1/2 solves the first-order condition
s = −H ′(q2). (4)
Because −H ′(q2) increases on [1/2, 1) and attains values in [0, ∞), (4) has a unique solution q2 ∈ (1/2, 1) that increases 
with the stake s.
Similarly, letting
H̃(q) = H(q) − H(γ q + (1 − γ )(1− q)),
q1 ≥ 1/2 solves
s = −H̃ ′(q1). (5)
By part A.4 of Assumption A,
H̃ ′′(q) = H ′′(q) − (2γ − 1)2H ′′(γ q + (1− γ )(1− q)) < 0.
Thus, −H̃ ′(q1) increases and attains values in [0, ∞) for q ∈ [1/2, 1). Thus also (5) has a unique solution q1 ∈ (1/2, 1) that 
increases with s. Additionally, q2 < q1 because −H ′(q) > −H̃ ′(q) for all q ∈ [1/2, 1); this proves Proposition 2.
To prove Proposition 3, we first analyze comparative statics with respect to γ . Posterior q2 is independent of γ . Posterior 
q1 increases with γ since −H̃ ′(q) decreases with γ for all q ∈ [1/2, 1). Hence p2 = γ q1 + (1 − γ )(1 − q1) increases with γ
too. We notice from (2) that 
∂φa1
∂p2
> 0. Thus, φa1 increases in γ , as needed.
We now examine comparative statics with respect to s under the assumption that H(·) is Shannon entropy. We combine 
(4) and (5) to get
H ′(q2) = H
′(q1) − (2γ − 1)H
′ (γ q1 + (1 − γ )(1− q1)) ,

















































































































































































where we have used (2γ − 1)(2q1 − 1) = (2p2 − 1) in the third step, 1−x1+x = 2q2 − 1 < (2q1 − 1) in the fourth step, and 
q1 > p2 in the last step.
We notice from (2) that φa1 decreases with s if 
p2+q2−1
q2−p2
decreases with s (since 1−p2
p2
decreases with q1 and hence with 











































where we have used dp2
dq1
= (2γ − 1) for the third equality, and 2p2−1
2γ −1 = 2q1 − 1 to establish the fourth equality. Therefore, 
it suffices to prove that




We observe that q2 = 1/2 when q1 = 1/2. Thus, by the Mean value theorem, there exists 1/2 < q̃1 < q1 such that,

















where the inequality follows from the fact that dq2
dq1
increases with q1 .
Setting with feedback: Again, q2 solves (4) and thus q2 increases with s and it is independent of γ . It follows from (3)
that φθ1 increases with γ . Finally, φθ1 decreases with q2 , and hence with s. 
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Table 5
Preliminary session: Data summary.
Frequency of a1 = θ1 Frequency of a2 = θ2 Frequency of a2 = a1 Frequency of a1 = θ2
I F .73 .66 .54 .55
IN .79 .79 .52 .49
C F .82 .81 .73 .70
CN .79 .74 .79 .70
Table 6
Preliminary session: Average marginal treatment effects, (their standard 
errors), and the p-values in the second lines. Bold values indicate sig-
nificance at the 1% level.
I F IN C F CN
a1 −.029 (.091) .037 (.056) .037 (.055) .449 (.083)
.748 .501 .500 .000
θ1 .129 (.101) −.023 (.046) .408 (.203) −.095 (.065)
.203 .617 .000 .144
θ2 .267 (.065) .552 (.072) .317 (.082) .436 (.099)
.000 .000 .000 .000
A.2. Preliminary Session
We ran a preliminary session prior to the regular sessions. Sixteen participating subjects obtained a $15 show-up fee 
and an additional $5 for a correct answer to the counting task (randomly selected at the end of the experiment). The 
parameters were: γ = .5 in treatments with independent states (I) and γ = .75 in treatments with correlated states (C ). As 
in the regular sessions, θ1 was revealed in between periods in the treatments F with feedback and it was not revealed in 
treatments N without feedback. The treatment order was I F , C F , IN , CN .
The basic data description in Table 5 and the estimated average marginal treatment effects in Table 6 are consistent 
with the results from the regular sessions. However, in this session, the subjects were free to leave immediately once 
they finished all their counting tasks in the last treatment (CN), which affected their information processing costs in an 
uncontrolled manner, and thus we omit the pilot data from the main analysis.
A.3. Experimental instructions
Instructions
Welcome to the experiment! Please take a record sheet at the front if you don’t have one already. Please do not use the 
computers during the instructions. When it is time to use the computer, please follow the instructions precisely. (Repeat if 
necessary.)
Please raise your hand if you need a pencil. Please put away and silence all your personal belongings, especially your 
phone. We need your full attention during the experiment.
Raise your hand at any point if you cannot see or hear well.
The experiment you will be participating in today is an experiment in decision making. At the end of the experiment, 
you will be paid for your participation in cash. The amount you earn depends on your decisions and on chance. You will 
be using the computer for the experiment, and all decisions will be made through the computer. DO NOT socialize or talk 
during the experiment.
All instructions and descriptions that you will be given in the experiment are accurate and true. In accordance with the 
policy of this lab, at no point will we attempt to deceive you in any way.
If you have any questions, raise your hand and your question will be answered out loud so everyone can hear.
After you have completed all the tasks, please wait while everyone else finishes his or her tasks. Once everyone has 
completed the experiment, I will ask you to fill in the questionnaire. After the questionnaire you will collect your earnings 
and leave.
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
I will now describe the main features of the experiment and show you how to use the software. Again, if you have any 
questions during this period, please raise your hand.
You will be presented with a series of choices to make. There will be four SETS of choices in today’s experiment. Each 
set contains twelve ITERATIONS, and each iteration has two PERIODS. In each period, you will be shown a picture of 100 
dots. Each dot will be either RED or BLUE. We have displayed an example of such a screen on your computer monitor (show 
an example screen Fig. 1).
This is an example of the screens you will see during the experiment. In every period, the picture will contain either 
51 red dots and 49 blue dots, or instead, 51 blue dots and 49 red dots. We will call these two cases MAJORITY RED and 
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Fig. 1. A scaled-down screenshot of the counting task.
MAJORITY BLUE, respectively. In each case, the dots are randomly allocated to the positions in the matrix. In each period 
the computer will choose randomly between MAJORITY RED and MAJORITY BLUE. You will be told in advance how likely 
each case is to happen.
In each period, you will be asked to determine if the image is MAJORITY RED or MAJORITY BLUE. While you may take 
as much time as you need to make your choice, the image will disappear after 45 seconds.
I am now going to describe the details of the experiment.
The experiment is divided into four SETS. In each set, you will be presented with twelve iterations, and each iteration 
consists of two periods, each with its own image. The rules for the 12 iterations within each set are identical, but the rules 
are different in different sets.
In PERIOD 1 of each iteration, the image is always generated so that there is an equal chance of MAJORITY RED and 
MAJORITY BLUE, meaning that there is a 50% chance of MAJORITY RED and a 50% chance of MAJORITY BLUE.
In period 2 of each iteration, the image will be generated in a way that differs across sets. In some sets, the majority 
color for period 2 is chosen in a way that is completely separate from the period 1 image, and is randomly generates so 
that there is an equal chance of MAJORITY RED and MAJORITY BLUE, just like the period 1 image. But in other sets, the 
period 2 image depends on the majority color of the period 1 image. In these sets, the computer generates the period 2 
image so that there is a 75% chance that the majority color matches the period 1 majority color, and a 25% chance that the 
majority color is different from the period 1 majority color.
It is important to remember that while the periods within each iteration may be related to each other, the periods across 
iterations are never related.
After making your choices, you will always be told what the majority color was, but the timing of this differs from set 
to set. In some sets, the majority colors will be revealed after every period. In other sets, the majority colors for an iteration 
will not be revealed until you complete both periods. Before each set, you will be told about the timing of the feedback you 
will receive.
The amount of money you will receive at the end of the experiment depends on your choices. After we have completed 
all four sets, you will have made 96 choices (4 sets times 12 iterations times 2 periods). The computer software will 
randomly select one of these 96 periods. Your payment will be determined by your choice in that single period. If your 
choices in the randomly chosen period matches the majority color, you will earn an additional $5 dollars on top of the $15 
show-up fee. Otherwise, you will receive no additional payment, but you will still receive the show-up fee.
After you complete the last set, please wait until we start the questionnaire part. After you finish the questionnaire, 
please fill your record sheet on the desk. I will pay one by one to keep everyone’s privacy.
To summarize, remember that we have four sets in the experiment today. Each set consists of 12 iterations, and each 
iteration consists of two periods. The sets will vary in how likely it is that the majority colors are the same for both periods 
within an iteration, and in the timing that the majority colors are revealed. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
(1) FI/FC/NI/NC
Feedback/IID:
In the next set of twelve iterations, the majority color for period 2 is randomly generated so that there is an equal chance 
of MAJORITY RED and MAJORITY BLUE, and it does not depend on the majority color in the first period.
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The majority colors will be revealed after every period, so that you will be told the majority color from period 1 before 
you see the image for period 2. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
Feedback/Corr.:
In the next set of twelve iterations, the majority color for period 2 is randomly generated so that there is a 75% chance 
that the majority color matches the majority color from period 1, and a 25% chance that the majority color is different from 
period 1.
The majority colors will be revealed after every period, so that you will be told the majority color from period 1 before 
you see the image for period 2. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
No Feedback/IID:
In the next set of twelve iterations, the majority color for period 2 is randomly generated so that there is an equal chance 
of MAJORITY RED and MAJORITY BLUE, and it does not depend on the majority color in the first period.
The majority colors for both periods of an iteration will be revealed only at the end of each iteration, so that you will 
see the period 2 image before being told the majority color from period 1. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
No Feedback/Corr.:
In the next set of twelve iterations, the majority color for period 2 is randomly generated so that there is a 75% chance 
that the majority color matches the period 1 majority color, and a 25% chance that the majority color is different from the 
period 1 majority color.
The majority colors for both periods of an iteration will be revealed only at the end of each iteration, so that you will 
see the period 2 image before being told the majority color from period 1. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
(2) NI/NC/FI/FC
No Feedback/IID:
In the next set of twelve iterations, the majority color for period 2 is randomly generated so that there is an equal chance 
of MAJORITY RED and MAJORITY BLUE, and it does not depend on the majority color in the first period.
The majority colors for both periods of an iteration will be revealed only at the end of each iteration, so that you will 
see the period 2 image before being told the majority color from period 1. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
No Feedback/Corr.:
In the next set of twelve iterations, the majority color for period 2 is randomly generated so that there is a 75% chance 
that the majority color matches the period 1 majority color, and a 25% chance that the majority color is different from the 
period 1 majority color.
The majority colors for both periods of an iteration will be revealed only at the end of each iteration, so that you will 
see the period 2 image before being told the majority color from period 1. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
Feedback/IID:
In the next set of twelve iterations, the majority color for period 2 is randomly generated so that there is an equal chance 
of MAJORITY RED and MAJORITY BLUE, and it does not depend on the majority color in the first period.
The majority colors will be revealed after every period, so that you will be told the majority color from period 1 before 
you see the image for period 2. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
Feedback/Corr.:
In the next set of twelve iterations, the majority color for period 2 is randomly generated so that there is a 75% chance 
that the majority color matches the majority color from period 1, and a 25% chance that the majority color is different from 
period 1.
The majority colors will be revealed after every period, so that you will be told the majority color from period 1 before 
you see the image for period 2. Please raise your hand if you have any question.
Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at https://doi .org /10 .1016 /j .geb .2020 .04 .013.
References
Abel, A., 1990. Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses. Am. Econ. Rev. 80 (2), 38–42.
Andrews, B.R., 1903. Habit. Am. J. Psychol. 14 (2), 121–149.
Angeletos, G.-M., Huo, Z., 2018. Collective Myopia and Habit. 2018 Meeting Papers, vol. 236. Society for Economic Dynamics.
Camerer, C., Landry, P., Webb, R., forthcoming. The neuroeconomics of habit. In: A. Kirman, M. Tedeschi (Eds.), The State of Mind, Oxford University Press.
406 L. Matysková et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 122 (2020) 391–406
Caplin, A., Dean, M., 2013. Behavioral implications of rational inattention with Shannon entropy. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 19318.
Caplin, A., Dean, M., 2015. Revealed preference, rational inattention, and costly information acquisition. Am. Econ. Rev. 105 (7), 2183–2203.
Caplin, A., Dean, M., Leahy, J., 2017. Rationally inattentive behavior: characterizing and generalizing Shannon entropy. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Working Paper Series No. 23652.
Dezfouli, A., Balleine, B.W., 2012. Habits, action sequences and reinforcement learning. Eur. J. Neurosci. 35 (7), 1036–1051.
Fischbacher, U., 2007. z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Exp. Econ. 10 (2), 171–178.
Khaw, M.W., Stevens, L., Woodford, M., 2017. Discrete adjustment to a changing environment: experimental evidence. J. Monet. Econ. 91, 88–103.
Khaw, M.W., Zorrilla, O., 2018. Deeper Habits.
Laibson, D., 2001. A cue-theory of consumption. Q. J. Econ. 116 (1), 81–119.
Lally, P., Van Jaarsveld, C.H., Potts, H.W., Wardle, J., 2010. How are habits formed: modelling habit formation in the real world. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40 (6), 
998–1009.
Mackowiak, B., Wiederholt, M., 2009. Optimal sticky prices under rational inattention. Am. Econ. Rev. 99 (3), 769–803.
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